This paper studies how decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to …rm level in ‡uences wage levels and wage dispersion. We use a detailed panel data set covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market. The decentralization process provides exogenous variation in the individual worker's wage-setting system that facilitates identi…cation of the e¤ects of decentralization. Consistent with predictions we …nd that wages are more dispersed under …rm-level bargaining compared to more centralized wage-setting systems. However, the di¤erences across wage-setting systems are reduced substantially when controlling for unobserved individual level heterogeneity.
Introduction
Several advanced countries have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage bargaining in the labor market during the past decades. Comparing the 1970's to the 1990's not a single OECD country moved towards centralization, whereas a considerable number moved towards greater decentralization according to OECD (2004) . This movement has in many countries been accompanied with a steady decline in union densities, while the extent of bargaining coverage has typically been unchanged. Decentralization of collective bargaining may have important implications for wage formation and wage dispersion in particular, but only scarce microeconometric evidence exist to document such e¤ects.
The principal aim of this paper is to empirically examine the movement of decentralization in wage bargaining in terms of its impact on wage dispersion. From a theoretical standpoint decentralization may lead to increased wage dispersion because …rm-and individual-speci…c characteristics are more likely to enter the wage contracts, while under centralized bargaining egalitarian union preferences are easier to accomplish. 1 Obviously, changes in wage dispersion may have important direct welfare implications through increased income inequality, but there may also be more indirect consequences. A movement away from a standard wage rate applying for all workers means that wages are more in accordance with individual productivity and local conditions, which tends to reduce misallocation, ine¢ ciencies and unemployment in the labor market. In contrast to this view, Moene and Wallerstein (1997) argue that centralized bargaining tends to bolster expanding progressive industries and hamper declining ones, while local bargaining allows less productive plants to reduce wages and remain in operation. Also when risk-averse individuals face uncertainty about their position in the income distribution, unions may improve welfare by compressing the wage structure, see Agell and Lommerud (1992) . In any case, it is clear that the link between bargaining level and wage dispersion is important for welfare, and a …rst step should be to empirically assess the extent to which decentralization increases wage dispersion.
Another aspect of decentralization is its impact on wage levels. A number of di¤erent explanations for higher mean wages under …rm level bargaining may be put forth. First, higher wages at the local level may be due to rent sharing, see e.g. Blanch ‡ower, Oswald and Sanfey (1996) . Second, …rms with local bargaining may encourage workers to work harder by o¤ering higher wages through e¢ ciency wage considerations, see e.g. Akerlof and Yellen (1988) . Third, …rm level bargaining may involve higher wages and lower employment due to insider-outsider e¤ects, see Fitzenberger and Franz (1999) . Fourth, it may be argued that decentralization of collective bargaining makes it less likely that unions internalize externalities of many di¤erent types, see Calmfors (1993) . For example decentralized wage increases may lead to higher product prices, thus increasing the cost of inputs for other …rms. Such externalities may be taken into account in more centralized bargaining settings and may induce unions to restrain their wage demands. However, Calmfors and Dri¢ ll (1988) argue that the relationship between centralization and wage outcomes is hump shaped. At the national level unions internalize externalities and moderate their wage demands, but at …rm level they also restrain wage demands because higher wages lead to higher product prices and lower demand for the goods produced by the …rm, thereby reducing employment in the …rm. At the industry level neither of these mechanisms are present to the same extent and so unions negotiate for higher wages at this level. For open economies Danthine and Hunt (1994) show that the hump shaped relationship between wages and centralization level ‡attens out as product market competition increases and so the room left open for diverging wage policies narrows. Thus the predictions concerning the impact of decentralization on wage levels are less clear-cut and is ultimately an empirical question.
We have access to a very rich longitudinal data set for private sector workers in the Danish labor market. The Danish labor market is interesting to study because four different wage setting systems, representing three di¤erent levels of centralization, coexist, and so their in ‡uence on wage formation may readily be compared. First, in one segment of the labor market wages are negotiated at industry level for all workers -this is the so-called standard-rate system. Clearly the scope for wages to re ‡ect individual productivity is limited under this system. Second, a considerable part of the labor market has bargaining between unions and employers at the industry level over a contractual wage, which is accompanied by local bargaining at the …rm level over an individual wage supplement (the minimum-pay and minimum-wage systems). In this case wages may better be in accordance with individual quali…cations due to the local level bargaining. Third, a segment of the labor market has no centrally negotiated contractual wage, and wages are entirely determined at the …rm level. Importantly, our data set covers a period where many labor market segments changed wage setting system towards bargaining at more decentralized levels. In particular, the importance of the segment with only …rm-level bargaining has increased during our sample window.
The longitudinal dimension of the data is crucial for two main reasons. First, identi-…cation of the e¤ects of decentralization on wage dispersion is greatly facilitated by the change of wage setting system over time for many workers. The wage setting system for the individual worker may change because the labor market segment changed its system due to the decentralization process or because the worker changed job. Second, in contrast to the existing empirical evidence, longitudinal data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Our econometric approach is quantile regression, since this, in a very transparent way, illustrates the impact of wage setting systems in di¤erent quantiles of the wage distribution. However, it is only recently that quantile regression methods have been developed to better exploit the advantages of longitudinal data, see Koenker (2004) and Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) . We apply the correlated random e¤ects approach suggested by Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) .
We …nd that decentralization of wage bargaining increases wage dispersion, i.e., wages are most dispersed under the most decentralized system -…rm level bargaining. By using the panel data quantile regression approach we also …nd that the di¤erences in wage dispersion between the wage setting systems are reduced substantially when unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled for. With respect to the impact on mean wages we do not …nd important di¤erences across bargaining systems after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews the existing empirical literature on unions and the dispersion of wages. Section 3 describes the institutional framework for wage bargaining in Denmark. This section also summarizes the aggregate development towards more decentralized wage bargaining in Denmark in the 1990's. Section 4 describes the data set, section 5 outlines the empirical framework, and the results are presented in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Unions and the dispersion of wages
The impact of unions on wage formation and wage dispersion is a subject that has long attracted the attention of economists. There exists a large literature assessing the wage di¤erential between union and non-union workers and the impact of unions on wage inequality (see e.g. Freeman (1980) for an early exposition and Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2004) for a recent review). This is an interesting issue in Anglo-Saxon countries where it makes sense to focus on union membership of the individual worker. However, in most continental European countries the relevant measure is the centralization level of bargaining, because even in countries with low union densities, bargaining agreements are typically extended to the majority of the workforce. In this section we brie ‡y review the existing microeconometric evidence of the impact of the bargaining level on wage formation.
One of the …rst studies of the subject is Dell'Aringa and Lucifora (1994), who investigated the Italian metal-mechanical industry with establishment survey data from 1990.
They found a positive wage di¤erential in …rms where unions are recognized for local bargaining as compared to …rms where only the nationally bargaining wages apply. In addition, they …nd that …rm-level bargaining raises wages more for white collar workers than for blue collar workers.
These results are consistent with a more recent paper by Card and de la Rica (2006) who study the e¤ect of …rm level contracting relative to regional or national contracts in Spain. They use the European Structure of Earnings Survey (ESES) from 1995, which is a matched worker-…rm data set with information on whether the worker belongs to a multi-employer bargaining regime or a regime with single-employer bargaining (…rm-level bargaining). They show that there is a positive wage premium of 5-10 per cent associated with single-employer bargaining. Interestingly, they also …nd that the premium is higher for more highly-paid workers using a weighted least squares approach. They take this as weak evidence for a more ‡exible wage structure under …rm-level bargaining. Using a cross section data set for 1991 Hartog, Leuven and Teulings (2002) investigate the impact of bargaining regime on wages in the Netherlands, and they …nd that mean wages under …rm-speci…c and industry-level contracting are very similar. They also observe workers in …rms with no collective bargaining and in …rms with mandatory extensions of an industry agreement, and wage di¤erentials between regimes were found to be no larger than 4 per cent. Also in terms of wage dispersion modest di¤erences are found between the four regimes, but …rm speci…c bargaining yields the greatest residual variation of wages.
Comparing contractual wages and actual wages Cardoso and Portugal (2005) …nd for Portugal a substantial wage cushion with industry averages of 20-50 per cent of the contractual wages. From tobit regressions it is found that the e¤ects of worker and …rm characteristics on contractual wage and the wage drift have the same sign, so that wage drift stretches the wage distribution. A measure for the degree of union bargaining power is constructed as the concentration of bargaining and Cardoso and Portugal …nd that the higher concentration the higher contractual wage rate and -by interacting this bargaining power measure with worker attributes -the lower returns to these attributes.
Interestingly, the higher contractual wage rate is o¤-set by a smaller wage drift.
The wage bargaining institutions in Germany share several characteristics with the Danish institutions, so the German case is of particular interest. Several empirical studies have provided cross-sectional estimates of the wage e¤ects of di¤erent bargaining regimes in Germany, and most tend to …nd that average wages and wage dispersion are higher under …rm level bargaining compared to sectoral level bargaining -see Fitzenberger,
Kohn and Lembcke (2008) for a recent survey of these studies. One study for Germany deserves special mention as it estimates the impact of wage-setting level on individual mean wages using longitudinal data. Gürtzgen (2006) …nds that unobserved heterogeneity is responsible for much of the observed wage premia associated with industry and …rm-level contracting (relative to no coverage of collective bargaining contracts), but positive premia for industry-level contracts in West Germany and for …rm-level contracts in East Germany remain. While we also estimate the impact of the wage-setting level on individual mean wages our primary focus is on the impact on wage dispersion.
To sum up, most results indicate that wages are higher when they are negotiated at the …rm level as compared to the industry level. However this result is refuted by the evidence from the Dutch labor market. With regards to the e¤ects on wage dispersion the evidence is more mixed although most results suggest that local bargaining leads to higher wage dispersion than industry level bargaining.
A distinguishing feature is that all the mentioned studies use cross section data (except Gürtzgen (2006) ), and a caveat applying here is that there may be unobserved di¤erences between workers covered by centrally and locally negotiated wage contracts. For example it may be argued that if …rms with local bargaining reward observed skills such as education more generously, they will likely also reward unobserved skills better. Besides this, if local bargaining is known to imply more dispersed wages, the Roy (1951) model would suggest that high ability workers sort into decentralized bargaining segments. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between local bargaining and unobserved ability and that appropriately controlling for unobserved heterogeneity should imply smaller estimated e¤ects of local bargaining arrangements.
Along the same lines, risk averse workers may select into centralized bargaining systems with more compressed wage structures, and they may be willing to pay a price in terms of lower average wages to do so. Worker level risk aversion is unobserved, so again failure to control for unobserved heterogeneity may lead to upward bias in the coe¢ cient to local bargaining systems.
With access to longitudinal data covering a period of decentralization we are in position to take account of unobserved heterogeneity and we may more reliably identify the e¤ects of decentralization since the decentralization process safely may be taken to be exogenous to the individual worker.
The Danish wage setting system
Whereas job protection is low in Denmark, the wage setting has been rather in ‡exible -Denmark has been one of the OECD countries with the most compressed wage structureswhich in part is due to a combination of three factors. First, the bene…t system is generous Wage bargaining at the industry and …rm levels depends on the wage setting system used in the industry collective agreement. In Denmark there are four di¤erent systems:
First, under the standard-rate system ("normallønssystemet") actual wages of workers are set by the industry collective agreement and the wages are not modi…ed at the …rm level. Second, under the minimum-wage system ("minimallønssystemet") the wage rates set at the industry level represent a ‡oor and are intended to be used only for very inexperienced workers. Hence, for other workers this wage rate is supplemented by a personal pay supplement. In practice, the personal pay supplements are often negotiated collectively with the cooperation of the workplace union members'representative. Third, a somewhat similar minimum-pay system ("mindstebetalingssystemet") exists. Rather than operating with a personal pay supplement on top of the industry-level negotiated wage rate, the minimum pay system uses a personal wage. The wage rate negotiated at the industry level can be thought of as a safety net in the form of a minimum hourly rate that must be paid under all circumstances. Finally, under …rm-level bargaining the collective agreements state that wages are negotiated at the plant or …rm level without any centrally bargained wage rates ("uden lønsats"). Table 1 shows the development in the use of these four wage setting systems in the private sector labor market covered by the two bargaining parties at national level; The
Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) and The Confederation of Danish Employers
(DA). There has been a trend towards more decentralized and ‡exible wage setting, where the proportion with a standard wage rate was more than halved. Since 1993 the most decentralized segment (i.e. the …rm-level bargaining segment) has grown from a coverage of 4 per cent to 22 per cent in 2004. For the two remaining decentralized wage systems -the minimum-wage and the minimum-pay systems -we also see considerable variation over time. An example of an important bargaining segment making the transition to …rm-level bargaining is the area covering o¢ ce clerks. In the empirical analysis below we use data for 1994-1999, so we capture the increased importance of …rm-level bargaining in particular.
Insert Table 1 in the analysis, and this wage rate is calculated as the sum of total labor income and mandatory pension fund payments divided by the total number of hours worked in any given year. The measure for total labor income as such is highly reliable since it comes from the tax authorities, and the pension fund payments are also available in the registers.
These payments were introduced in the early 1990s, and have been rising throughout the sample period, but not in a uniform manner across collective bargaining segments of the labor market and they are therefore important to account for.
We use very detailed industry and occupation variables to determine the collective agreement to which the individual belongs. The industry code follows the NACE industry classi…cation, and the occupation variable is based on the so-called DISCO code, which is the Danish version of the ISCO-88 classi…cation. We use the most disaggregated de…nition of the industry-and occupation codes, i.e., the six digit NACE code and the four digit DISCO code. By using these industry and occupation variables to de…ne bargaining segments of the labor market we follow the two bargaining parties at national level, LO and DA -they use the codes to assess the economic implications of proposals for the workers and employers they represent. That is, we determine the bargaining segments in the same way as DA and LO, when the parties evaluate the bargaining outcome. However, the construction of such bargaining segments is not completely ‡awless. For example, a …rm may wish to stay outside its industry's collective agreement and we will not be able to see this in the data. Nevertheless we are con…dent that our allocation of workers into bargaining segments is fairly accurate since we end up with a distribution of workers across wage setting systems that resembles Table 1 quite closely (more on this below).
We have identi…ed 31 bargaining segments within the DA/LO segment, which correspond to roughly 50 per cent of workers in the organized part of the private labor market in Denmark. Coupled with information about the bargaining system each segment operates under in each year, it was straightforward to partition all workers into the four bargaining systems under consideration.
A long list of individual socio economic characteristics are used as control variables in the analysis. We use dummies for gender, the presence of children, marriage, immigrant status, city size ('Large city', and 'Rural' with 'Copenhagen' as the omitted category), education ('Unskilled', 'Short term higher education', 'Long term higher education'with 'Vocational education'as the omitted category) 3 and experience (measured as actual labor market experience since 1964). There are also dummies for the size of the workplace measured in terms of the workforce. Furthermore, di¤erent industries may face di¤erent degrees of competition from abroad, which may well be re ‡ected in both the wage level and the wage dispersion within a given industry. To avoid that wage setting dummies pick up di¤erences in business conditions between industries we include a set of industry dummies.
In Table 2 we show some summary statistics for each of the four wage setting systems in 1997. With respect to the average wage level the unconditional evidence is mixed since the most decentralized segment, …rm-level bargaining, has the highest wage level while the standard-rate system, which is the least decentralized wage setting system, has the third highest wage level. To assess the extent of wage dispersion we have also computed the unconditional 90th/10th, 90th/50th and the 50th/10th per centile ratios for each of the wage setting systems. The wage dispersion is much higher for the workers belonging to the minimum-wage system which is particularly true for the lower end of the wage distribution. Wage dispersion under …rm-level bargaining appear to be only slightly higher than the remaining two wage setting systems -the standard-rate system and the minimum-pay system. It should be noted that, since the standard-rate system typically applies for unskilled workers while many skilled workers belong to the minimum-wage system, we should not put too much emphasis on the unconditional evidence in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here With our longitudinal data set identi…cation of the impact of wage setting system on wages rests on the existence of workers who change wage setting system. This can happen for two reasons; the bargaining segment may change its system as a part of the decentralization process or the worker may change job. Table 3 tracks the persons in our sample that change wage setting system in each year. The second column shows the total number of workers changing wage setting system, and it is seen that there is a transition rate of between 3 and 13 per cent each year. Column 3-6 decompose the total annual changes further. First, the entire bargaining segment can change wage setting system due to the decentralization process (column 3), which contributes with the majority of transitions. Second, a worker can change occupation and/or industry and, thereby, perhaps also bargaining segment and wage setting system (column 4-6). 4 Insert Table 3 about here Since the wage setting system variable is constructed based on the industry and occupation codes measurement error may arise -in particular the occupation code is known to be unstable within job spells in some years, and this may bias our estimates. In relation to panel data estimations of a union membership e¤ect on wages Freeman (1984) argues that measurement error in the union membership variable will lead to a downward-biased estimate of the e¤ect. However, when entire bargaining segments change wage setting system as in our data, measurement error is less of a problem compared to the situation where we only rely on people changing jobs and, thereby, wage setting system. The data still include job changers, however (see columns 4-6 in Table 3 ), so in the empirical analysis below we restrict the sample further to reduce potential problems with measurement error. Speci…cally we throw away all workers that change wage setting system because of a shift in the occupation code (column 5) unless they also change employer. This reduces the number of wage setting system changes due to occupation changes by approximately 90 per cent. Table 1 is Table 4 . Even though we only distinguish between 31 bargaining segments and, thus, leave out part of the DA/LO segment, the development in Table 4 resembles that of Table 1 quite closely. As described above, much of the decentralization of the bargaining level in Denmark took place before 1993, but this is not essential to the analysis as long as we still have considerable time variation in the data.
The sample version of
Insert Table 4 about here
Empirical framework
To assess the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion we use quantile regression.
Quantile regression techniques for panel data have only recently been developed, and this section outlines the approach we follow. The standard (cross section) quantile regression model of Koenker and Bassett (1978) is given by
where i = 1; :::; N is indexing the individuals, y i is the log of the individual hourly wage rate, is a k 1 vector and x i is a 1 k vector of explanatory variables. Q (y i jx i ) denotes the th conditional quantile of y given x, 2 (0; 1).
In the linear model the solution to endogeneity problems in presence of panel data is typically the …xed-e¤ects estimation. Unfortunately, the usual di¤erencing strategy does not apply here since the conditional quantiles are not linear operators, that is
where time periods t 6 = s and where x i (x i1 ; :::; x iT ). 
where t = 1; 2; :::; T , c i is the individual speci…c term and u it the error term.
As in Chamberlain (1982 Chamberlain ( , 1984 assume that the unobservable term c i is a linear projection onto the observables plus a disturbance v i , that is
Plugging this into equation (3) gives
We need to make two assumptions in order to estimate the model in equation (5):
Assumption (A1) is also needed in the traditional random-e¤ects probit model (see for example Wooldridge (2002)), but is stronger than the conditional mean independence needed in the linear Chamberlainian random-e¤ects model. By assumption (A2) we assume strict exogeneity, which e¤ectively rules out feedback-e¤ects from current wages, y it ;
on future values of x it .
The partial derivative of the conditional quantile with respect to x it is
and
for t 6 = s. Following Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) we measure the e¤ect of x it as 
where it is a standard normal random variable. It is apparent that for t > 0 the e¤ect of x it is larger in the upper part of the y it distribution.
One drawback is that the approach only works for balanced panels. As a consequence, we estimate the model on alternative balanced (sub-) samples. First, we construct a sample with individuals we observe twice or more in the sample and randomly select two observations for each individual from this set. Second, we extract a subsample with individuals observed at least four times and randomly select four observations per individual.
Third, we use the Mundlak (1978) version of the correlated random-e¤ects model where the unobserved part is approximated by averages of the observed covariates. In this case the unobservable term becomes
This facilitates the use of all observations, i.e. unbalanced samples, but it comes at the expense of restricting the linear projection in equation (4). 
As shown by

Results
This section …rst presents results for the impact of wage setting systems on mean wages using a standard Mincer wage equation approach. This is followed by results for the impact on wage dispersion using the panel data quantile regression approach outlined in the previous section. Finally we present some robustness checks of our preferred speci…cation.
Wage levels and wage-setting systems
While our focus is on the the impact of decentralization on wage dispersion it is instructive to …rst study how mean wages di¤er across wage setting systems controlling for individual heterogeneity. Table 5 reports estimation results from a pooled OLS as well as linear random-e¤ects, …xed-e¤ects and correlated random e¤ects models.
It is …rst seen that we obtain the usual signs of the human capital and socio-demographic variables. With respect to the wage setting systems the most clean comparison is between the standard-rate system (where wages are negotiated at sector or industry level) and …rm level bargaining since these systems represent the most centralized and the most decentralized systems respectively. As described in section 3 the minimum payment and minimum wage systems are intermediate cases as they both have elements of a centrally negotiated wage ‡oor and locally negotiated wage supplements. In the following we use as the base category the standard-rate system. For the OLS regression we …nd that wages are 5.3 per cent higher under …rm level bargaining than under the standard-rate system. However, this quite substantial wage di¤erential vanishes if unobserved individual heterogeneity is controlled for through random e¤ects or correlated random e¤ects, and if the …xed e¤ects estimator is used the e¤ect even changes sign such that wages are 1.1 per cent lower under …rm level bargaining. This clearly suggests that it is important to control for unobserved heterogeneity and that failure to do so leads to an upward bias in the coe¢ cient, i.e., unobserved ability may be better rewarded under local bargaining. With respect to the two intermediate systems there is also a negative e¤ect of minimum pay once unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for, while there is no or a small positive wage di¤erential between the standard rate system and the minimum wage system.
Insert Table 5 about here
One might worry that the negative coe¢ cients to the decentralized wage-setting dummies (e.g. …rm-level bargaining dummy under the …xed e¤ects speci…cation) re ‡ect a correlation between …rm-level wage growth and the decentralization process that are not captured by our control variables. For example, one can imagine that …rms that experience a negative demand shock will push for wages to be negotiated at the …rm level. It is important here to note that the bargaining regime is agreed on by central unions and employers associations, so the decentralization process should be exogenous to the individual …rm. Still, if entire industries are hit by negative shocks there could be a correlation. To capture such e¤ects we have extended the models from Table 5 to include also industry speci…c time trends that should pick up declining wage trends. This extension had a negligible impact on the estimated coe¢ cients to the wage-setting system dummies. 5 To sum up, we …nd evidence of no wage di¤erentials or even lower mean wages under the more decentralized bargaining systems, and this seems to be at odds with what is expected from simple rent-sharing or e¢ ciency-wage considerations, while it is more consistent with the externality explanation of Calmfors and Dri¢ l (1988) as argued in the introduction. Also, it is important to be able to control for unobserved heterogeneity as otherwise the wage di¤erentials between wage-setting systems are greatly exaggerated.
One important aspect which cannot be studied using the simple mean regressions is the fact that the decentralization process may have very uneven e¤ects across the wage distribution -an issue to which we now turn.
Wage dispersion and wage-setting systems
As a …rst step we will start out with a simple quantile regression without exploiting the longitudinal nature of our data. Table 6 Of particular interest is the e¤ect of the wage system dummies, and it is found that the coe¢ cient on the variables for the three decentralized systems increases over almost all of the reported quantiles, so that the e¤ects at the 90th quantile are substantially higher compared to the e¤ects at the 10th quantile. For example the e¤ect of working under …rm-level bargaining compared to the standard-rate system almost triples from the 10th to the 90th quantile (from 4.1 per cent to 11.5 per cent). Thus these results support the prediction that decentralization leads to increased wage dispersion for example because …rm-and individual-speci…c characteristics are more likely to enter wage contracts, or because egalitarian union preferences become more di¢ cult to accomplish. However, we suspect that the coe¢ cients on the wage system dummies are biased upwards because unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled for.
Insert Table 6 about here The next step is to apply the panel data quantile regression techniques outlined in section 5. Table 7 shows results for estimation of the Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) correlated random-e¤ects quantile regression model for the case where we balance the panel by randomly selecting only two observations for each individual for the reasons explained above. It is …rst noted that the e¤ects of individual level variables only change slightly.
Some variables like age and experience appear to have somewhat stronger e¤ects now, but otherwise the results are robust. However, for the wage system dummies the picture changes in important ways. For …rm level bargaining we …nd again that wage dispersion is higher than under the standard-rate system, but the coe¢ cients are in accordance with the fact that there is roughly no mean e¤ects, cf. Table 5 . That is, we …nd negative coe¢ cients in the lower quantiles and positive coe¢ cients in the higher quantiles such that workers under …rm-level bargaining earn 2.1 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 4.0 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile compared to workers under the standardrate system. There appears to be no signi…cant di¤erences between the minimum-pay system and the standard-rate system, while the minimum-wage system increases wages in the upper part of the wage distribution.
Insert Table 7 about here
To study how these results depend on the sampling scheme we also estimate the correlated random-e¤ects quantile regression model where we randomly select four instead of two observations for each worker. This e¤ectively corresponds to selecting stable workers in the sense that they enter the original sample at least four out of the six years in our sample window. With respect to the …rm-level bargaining system the results are qualitatively similar but the e¤ects are slightly stronger such that workers now earn 3.4 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 2.4 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile compared to workers under the standard-rate system, see Table 8 . The minimum-pay system now has a negative e¤ect in the 10th quantile but there are no changes otherwise, and the e¤ects of the minimum-wage system are also not changed in any important way.
Insert Table 8 about here
To cast further light on the importance of the sampling scheme we also estimate a ver-sion of the correlated random e¤ects quantile regression model where we approximate the unobservable part with the individual means of the explanatory variables as in Mundlak (1978) , see equation (10). This has the advantage that we can use all observations in our original sample and thus circumvent the requirement of a balanced sample, but it comes at the expense of a more restrictive functional form for the unobservables. The results are displayed in Table 9 , and it is seen that they are very much in accordance with the two previous sets of results. At the 90th quantile the e¤ect of …rm-level bargaining lie in between the e¤ects found for the balanced sample with two observations per worker and the balanced sample with four observation per worker. At the bottom of the wage distribution the e¤ect is somewhat closer to zero but still signi…cantly negative.
Insert Table 9 In the following we will take the Mundlak version of the empirical model as our main speci…cation as it yields very similar results to the more ‡exible models while still being based on the full sample. For illustrative purposes we have used this model to compute the coe¢ cients for every two per centiles and plot them with 5 per cent con…dence bands -see Figure 1 . This shows very clearly that wage dispersion is higher under …rm level bargaining.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Robustness
A major advantage of our analysis vis-à-vis the existing literature is that we exploit time variation in the wage system of the individual worker, but this also raises the question about whether wage system changes are exogenous. We argue that if the wage system change because of the decentralization process, i.e. a whole bargaining segment changes wage system, then this can safely be taken to be exogenous to the worker. The wage system may also change because workers change jobs from one bargaining segment of the labor market to another, and in this case endogeneity may be an issue as e.g. high paid workers in the standard-rate system may be inclined to change to jobs under …rm-level bargaining to receive a higher wage. In traditional Mincer human capital wage equations this issue may be approached by also estimating a selection equation for the choice of wage system (see e.g. Vella and Verbeek (1998) for an application to union wage premia).
However, corresponding techniques are not yet developed for the panel data quantile regression case, and in any case this approach also requires proper instruments which is not immediately available in our data. Therefore, to proceed we have to settle for more indirect evidence for exogeneity of the wage system variables. Table 3 showed that most wage system changes are due to the decentralization process, so a straightforward sensitivity test would be to simply leave out all wage system changes that can be ascribed to job changes. However, our reference wage system is the standardrate system because it represents the most clear-cut example of a wage system with wage determined solely at the sector level, but no bargaining segments changed to or from the standard-rate system during our sample window (see Tables 1 and 4 ), so we have to rely on job movers. In the following, we study whether these job changes are plagued by endogeneity.
The …rst step is to provide some further descriptive statistics for the wage system changes. According to Table 3 , there are 45,314 wage system changes in the data, and almost two thirds of these are due to the decentralization process and the rest is job mobility. Among job changes involving the standard rate system the most frequent type is between the standard rate system and the minimum pay system -more than one third of all job changes are in this category. In fact only very few workers change job from the standard-rate system to a job under …rm-level bargaining or vice versa, but once we can identify the wage e¤ects of changing between the standard-rate system and minimum-pay we have also identi…ed the e¤ects of …rm-level bargaining because of su¢ ciently many exogenous 'decentralization'transitions between minimum-pay and …rm-level bargaining.
Since most of the mobility in and out of the standard-rate system is to/from the minimum-pay system and since identi…cation therefore relies on this transition in particular we will now study potential endogeneity of this transition only. One way to do this is to include two additional dummy variables for a change between the two wage systems,
i.e. the variable 'Change standard-rate to minimum-pay'in Table 10 Insert Table 10 about here
The next question is whether we would get similar results to the main results of Table   9 if in addition to the exogenous 'decentralization'transitions we rely only on job movers between the standard-rate system and the minimum-wage system, i.e. if we remove all observations involving other types of job mobility. A Comparison between the results of Table 9 and 11 shows only small changes in the coe¢ cients on the wage system variables, so mobility between standard-rate and minimum-wage systems is su¢ cient to get the main results and these job changes appear not to be driven by wage concerns. We take this as evidence for our main results not being seriously plagued by endogenity bias through job mobility.
Insert Table 11 about here
Conclusion
Many European labor markets have undergone a process towards more decentralized wage bargaining during recent decades. Such changes may have important welfare implications both in terms of e¢ ciency and equity. When wages are negotiated locally at the …rm level as opposed to more centralized bargaining, they are more likely to re ‡ect individual productivity and …rm speci…c conditions. This should lead to increased wage dispersion.
We use a unique register-based panel data set covering a period of decentralization in the Danish labor market, and to the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to study these questions using longitudinal data. This is a crucial element because the time variation allows us to identify the e¤ects of decentralization as many workers have seen their wage setting system change as a result of the decentralization process. In contrast, the existing literature has relied on cross section data. Also, in contrast to previous studies, the longitudinal dimension allows us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. This is important because by doing so the wage structure di¤erences across wage-setting systems are substantially narrowed down.
We …nd empirical evidence in support of the predictions from theory, i.e., wage dispersion is higher under the more decentralized wage setting systems. In our main speci…cation workers under …rm-level bargaining, where wages are set entirely at the …rm level, earn 1.7 per cent lower wages at the 10th quantile and 3.2 per cent higher wages at the 90th quantile compared to workers under the standard-rate system, where wages are entirely set at the sector level.
Firm-level bargaining
Minimum pay Minimum wage -0.010 0.018 ** 0.019 *** 0.010 0.027 ** 0.017 ** (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.007) Change standard rate to minimum pay -0.002 -0.011 * -0.014 ** -0.004 -0.001 0.001 (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) Change minimum pay to standard rate -0.012 -0.001 0.001 -0.013 ** -0.014 -0.002 (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) Age/10 1.109 *** 1.013 *** 0.672 *** 0.608 *** 0.605 *** 0.896 *** (0.030) (0.024) (0.021) (0.026) (0.032) (0.020) Age squared/100 -0.107 *** -0.084 *** -0.051 *** -0.044 *** -0.042 *** -0.073 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Woman -0.127 *** -0.146 *** -0.168 *** -0.184 *** -0.198 *** -0.161 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Children aged 0-6 0.062 *** 0.049 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.031 *** 0.044 *** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) Non-western immigrant 0.006 -0.011 *** -0.028 *** -0.043 *** -0.054 *** -0.021 *** (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) Large city -0.067 *** -0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.073 *** -0.064 *** -0.070 *** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Rural -0.074 *** -0.083 *** -0.082 *** -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.076 *** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Experience/10 0.530 *** 0.304 *** 0.157 *** 0.097 *** 0.052 ** 0.244 *** (0.029) (0.021) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023) (0.017) Experience squared/100 -0.079 *** -0.060 *** -0.037 *** -0.025 *** -0.022 *** -0.050 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Unskilled -0.110 *** -0.108 *** -0.079 *** -0.067 *** -0.061 *** -0.108 *** (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Short term higher education 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.059 *** 0.056 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 *** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) Long term higher education 0.122 *** 0.154 *** 0.180 *** 0.193 *** 0.215 *** 0.169 *** (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.021 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 *** 0.025 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.048 *** 0.047 *** 0.042 *** 0.046 *** 0.051 *** 0.050 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.065 *** 0.065 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** 0.067 *** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of 10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signicant at 10%; ** Signicant at 5%; *** Signicant at 1%. OLS Firm-level bargaining -0.022 *** -0.014 ** -0.002 0.018 *** 0.042 *** 0.013 *** (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) Minimum pay -0.012 * -0.011 * -0.013 ** -0.003 0.016 * 0.001 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) Minimum wage -0.017 ** 0.028 *** 0.021 *** 0.027 *** 0.051 *** 0.034 *** (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) Age/10 1.154 *** 1.047 *** 0.674 *** 0.602 *** 0.589 *** 0.921 *** (0.036) (0.026) (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.019) Age squared/100 -0.109 *** -0.084 *** -0.049 *** -0.041 *** -0.037 *** -0.072 *** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) Woman -0.126 *** -0.145 *** -0.169 *** -0.186 *** -0.201 *** -0.162 *** (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Children aged 0-6 0.064 *** 0.051 *** 0.031 *** 0.029 *** 0.031 *** 0.044 *** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Non-western immigrant 0.010 ** -0.008 * -0.027 *** -0.041 *** -0.054 *** -0.018 *** (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Large city -0.067 *** -0.076 *** -0.075 *** -0.071 *** -0.062 *** -0.070 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) Rural -0.074 *** -0.084 *** -0.082 *** -0.079 *** -0.073 *** -0.076 *** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Experience/10 0.523 *** 0.264 *** 0.120 *** 0.061 *** 0.026 0.210 *** (0.032) (0.022) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) Experience squared/100 -0.080 *** -0.058 *** -0.035 *** -0.024 *** -0.022 *** -0.050 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) Unskilled -0.108 *** -0.107 *** -0.077 *** -0.065 *** -0.059 *** -0.108 *** (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) Short term higher education 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.051 *** 0.051 *** (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) Long term higher education 0.116 *** 0.151 *** 0.181 *** 0.195 *** 0.219 *** 0.169 *** (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) Workplace size, 16-50 workers 0.023 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.024 *** 0.023 *** (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) Workplace size, 51-200 workers 0.045 *** 0.041 *** 0.038 *** 0.045 *** 0.051 *** 0.047 *** (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) Workplace size, 200+ workers 0.060 *** 0.056 *** 0.057 *** 0.061 *** 0.062 *** 0.062 *** (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) Notes: The results are based on the 30% sample of workers. Year and industry dummies were included in all regressions. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. The bootstrap uses a subsample size of 10.000 persons and 1.000 replications. * Signicant at 10%; ** Signicant at 5%; *** Signicant at 1%.
